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DIPLOMATIC AMBIGUITY: FROM THE POWER-








The author proposes a theoretical guide for a practice-oriented analysis of diplomatic
ambiguity. Based primarily on both the comments by classical diplomatic theorists and his
own historical interpretation of the use of diplomatic ambiguity during the Rambouillet
negotiations on the status of Kosovo/a, he offers a reconstruction of the power-centric view
of diplomatic ambiguity that has been, as he demonstrates, implicitly endorsed by the key
actors of the Rambouillet negotiating process. He claims that, though such a view can give
one some insight into contingent historical developments and help one understand some
cases of diplomatic practice, it suffers from several flaws that make it an unlikely candidate
for a viable and comprehensive theory of diplomatic ambiguity. Furthermore the author
presents, in a rudimentary and preliminary form, an alternative, more reasoned view of
diplomatic ambiguity that is, on the one hand, language-centric and non-legalistic, and, on
the other, sufficiently responsive to doxatic/cognitive aspects of ambiguity and also consistent
with Der Derians concept of diplomacy as mediation of estrangement.
Keywords: diplomatic ambiguity, ambiguity  the power-centric view, ambiguity  a reasoned
view, Rambouillet negotiations, peace talks, US diplomacy
Strong evidence1 suggests that diplomatic ambiguity was used as a tool of a power-
mechanism during the Rambouillet and Paris peace talks that paved the way to
1999 NATO air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This fact alone
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and Classical Greek with literature from the Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb, and in 1997 the
Masters in Diplomacy from the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Malta (with
summa cum laude) where he also guest-lectured in 2000 and 2001 on the topic of language
and diplomacy. His primary research interest is in international political discourse as well as
in broader philosophical, political and ethical issues pertaining to such a discourse.
1 This paper is based on my PhD research conducted at SPIRE, Keele University, UK. I would
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lends support to two interrelated, and equally urgent, requirements: first, to try to
discern the exact mechanism by which a diplomatic ambiguity can be put into the
service of power-considerations; and, secondly, to try to understand the extent to
which the power-centric approach to diplomatic ambiguity adequately matches
the main features of the concept; and, if such an extent is low or insufficient, to
outline a view which provides a more adequate match.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. I aim here to present a power-centric view,
which is implicitly endorsed by any power-centric practice, of diplomatic ambiguity.
My presentation will be substantiated with a short discussion of what was, in my
view, the key diplomatic ambiguity of the Rambouillet and Paris talks. I will hence
fully respond to the first requirement. However, here I will only partially respond to
the second. I will in the briefest and simplest theoretical terms explain why the
power-centric perspective on diplomatic ambiguity provides a flawed account. This
is the second purpose of this paper. Due to limitations of space, here I cannot
outline fully an alternative view of diplomatic ambiguity. I will only give a number of
hints about the direction in which such a view should be sought. Nevertheless the
main moral of my paper will be sufficiently clear. One can prove, first, that, on the
assumption that my account of Rambouillet diplomacy holds, a serious theoretical
error was committed during the Rambouillet/Paris peace talks; and, secondly, that
there are ways of thinking of diplomatic ambiguity that can avoid such an error
and thereby help us to replace a bad diplomatic practice with a better one informed
by a more reasoned, both conflict-reducing and conflict-preventing theory of
ambiguity as diplomacys highly important device.
This papers first section will give a brief introductory definition of the concept of
diplomatic ambiguity. By focusing on a number of, for diplomatic studies, defining
theoretical figures, the second section provides a first step towards illumination of
the power-centric approach to diplomatic ambiguity. The third section describes
the evolution and collapse of the 1999 Rambouillet/Paris peace talks, emphasising
the role of an ambiguous provision of the Rambouillet Draft Agreement. Hence my
interpretation of the Rambouillet peace talks is not intended as a full historical
account of all the factors that have played an important role prior to, during, and
immediately after the talks. It is limited on a single, but within this context singularly
important factor. In the fourth section I will then try to illuminate fully all the main
elements of the power-centric perspective and its main variants. The fifth section is
devoted to two tasks: to provide a succinct critique of the power-centric perspective,
on the one hand, and to indicate the direction in which better solutions can be
searched and found, on the other.
especially like to thank Hidemi Suganami and John Horton, as my supervisors, and Patrick
Thornberry, for their valuable comments and enthusiastic support to my work. I also thank the
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the first version of this paper, which has prompted me to rephrase, expand on, and clarify
some of the key points of my argument.
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1. DEFINITION
To define diplomatic ambiguity one needs to define the concept of ambiguity, in
the first step, and then, in the second, to specify what makes ambiguity a diplomatic
one.
As the first approximation, ambiguity can be defined as a pattern of language
the meaning of which cannot be discerned with certainty. For instance, flying
(air)plane may be dangerous can be interpreted as being about the danger of
flying as well as about the danger of (air)planes. The spy put out the torch can be
interpreted as both the spy displayed the torch and the spy extinguished the
torch.2
Such instances of ambiguity show that, though their meaning cannot be
discerned with certainty, one can think of their potential meanings. Ambiguity can
then be defined as a pattern of language which potentially carries a number of
different meanings, and one is undecided as to which of the meanings is actually
conveyed.3 But, this is not all. The concept of ambiguity is especially interesting
because an ambiguous sentence, word, or a text, opens the possibility of different,
and, more importantly, incompatible meanings. This latter factor explains the tension
everyone feels in facing, and reading, an ambiguity.
In other words, ambiguity is a product of our ignorance of a particular kind. We
are ignorant about which (of two, or more) meanings should be taken as attached
to the ambiguous sentence (word, text), but this ignorance is founded on our
knowledge of possibilities, because we know that the sentence could carry a number
of meanings, and we know which meanings it could carry.
It is important to add further that such ignorance heavily depends on contextual
factors. Seen as a part of a wider context, and when the context is sufficiently
transparent and coherent, ambiguities can be disambiguated. This means that both
an ambiguous sentence, and its context, should be taken as the foundations upon
which the attribution of ambiguity is set. For our ignorance to be real and justified,
we also need to make sure that the context is of such a kind that, perhaps
temporarily, it cannot help us to disambiguate an ambiguity. This means that the
attribution of ambiguity usually also depends on incoherent, or non-transparent,
or insufficient, pool of contextual factors. Depending on the way we relate such
2 As one of the referees for this paper pointed out, flying plane(s) may be dangerous can be
easily transformed into a non-ambiguous sentence by adding a definite article: flying the
plane may be dangerous; such additions, of course, can help us to cope with syntactical
ambiguities that depend on syntactical relations within the (ambiguous) sentences; however,
I am not sure if one could always find such a simple cure for all instances of syntactical
ambiguity; anyway, my key purpose here is to give a few examples of ambiguity: in the
existing literature on ambiguity, Flying plane may be dangerous together with Visiting
philosophers may be unpleasant are amongst the most frequently quoted examples. Note
also that the spy put out the torch is a referential, or lexical, type of ambiguity.
3 As M. Beardsley (1961.:41) claims, a case of ambiguity is a case where there is some doubt
about a way a discourse is to be interpreted, and you have to choose between alternative
readings. See also Munson (1976.:73).
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contextual factors with our ignorance concerning the potential meanings of an
ambiguity, we can make distinction between referential, syntactical, and cross-
-textual kinds of ambiguity.4
I also need to emphasise here that ambiguity obviously cannot be identified
with a sheer contradiction, or non-sense, or incompatibility. When we say that a
sentence (word, text) is ambiguous we do not discard it as a sheer non-sense, or as
being in violation of the principle of contradiction. The meanings we relate with an
ambiguous pattern of language are incompatible, but they are merely potential;
that is why our first reaction to such a pattern consists in an attempt to interpret it,
to learn more about the context or intentions of the producer of ambiguity. We do
not respond to such a pattern with an immediate desire to discard it.
Another point is worthy of emphasising. The potential meanings we attach to
an ambiguity should not be taken as some spiritual beings stored behind the material
substance of ambiguity. For instance, the difference between Flying plane may be
dangerous when interpreted as being about dangerous planes, on the one hand,
and when interpreted as being about the danger of flying, on the other, depends
on the difference in imagined syntactical bracketing of the elements of the sentence.
It amounts to the difference between (flying) (plane may be dangerous) and
(flying (plane) may be dangerous). These are, however, materially different
instantiations of the same form.5 This means that the potential meanings one attaches
to an ambiguous pattern of language in fact represent materially different
instantiations of the pattern we identify as ambiguous.
Such considerations on the concept of ambiguity can be summarised in the
following way. Ambiguity is an effect of our ignorance of a particular kind6 as well
as of the fact that language may portray an uncertain claim, or a directed question
(i.e. expressions of ignorance), as a certain claim, or assertion (i.e. expressions of
knowledge). As ignorance in meanings often depends on ignorance in beliefs, there
is only one way for an ambiguity to be disambiguated  by amassing more beliefs,
or by inventing new beliefs, or by finding the ways to restore coherence in the sets
of beliefs. It goes without saying that ambiguity should be disambiguated. The
situation of ambiguousness is a situation of an arrested choice, of undecidability,
out of which we, as language-using beings, almost automatically seek an escape.
What is it that makes ambiguity a diplomatic one?
To make a long answer as short as possible, we can say that ambiguity is a
diplomatic ambiguity to the extent that it is present in important locations of
diplomatic texts/documents. This means that diplomatic ambiguity is, simply, an
4 The cross-textual kind is usually found in highly complex literary texts, for instance H.
Jamess, for an analysis of which see Rimmon (1977.). See a similar list of the kinds of ambi-
guity in Todorov (1983.:54-55).
5 This means that I agree with Harman (1975.: esp. 292-3), but disagree with Pinker (1995.:79),
and Chafe (1970.:73-91, esp. 77). This also means that I disagree with Pinkers claim that
ambiguity should be taken as evidence supporting the language of thought hypothesis. For a
succinct critique of such hypothesis, see Davidson (1997.).
6 For an equivalent theory of vagueness as a kind of ignorance, see Williamson (1996.:185-215).
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ambiguity which performs an important diplomatic function. International
agreements, especially peace agreements, are one obvious case in point.7 By making
an important treaty provision ambiguous, a treaty-maker hopes that she can
temporarily meet the conflicting demands of the parties to the treaty. One party
will focus on ambiguitys possible meaning A, whilst the other will focus on possible
meaning B. Both parties will, at least provisionally, hope that the ambiguous provision
carries enough substance to satisfy their demands.
For instance, UN Security Council Resolution 242 attempts to satisfy both Arab
(and Soviet) demand that the Israeli Defence Force withdraws from all territories
occupied in the course of 6-Day War, and Israeli (and the US) demand that some
room be opened to a revision of the pre-6-Day War borders between Israel and its
Arab neighbours, The Kingdom of Jordan primarily. The 242 ambiguity was a result
of an application of a number of principles that seemed to be difficult to reconcile
at the time of adoption of 242: the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the principle of the right to live within secure and recognised
borders free from the threat of neighbouring countries. More importantly, due to
its sheer brevity, the UN SC 242 did not specify which party should make which
steps, or which parts of the territory occupied in June 1967 should be made subject
to territorial revision.8
James Der Derian has defined diplomacy as mediation of estrangement.9 This
implies that diplomatic ambiguitys primary role is to mediate between estranged
diplomatic entities, including states, governments, peoples representatives, and
various international institutions. But, strangely enough, diplomatic ambiguity is
usually looked at as something that does not mediate, but deepens estrangement.
One usually focuses on the fact that diplomatic ambiguity gives rise to an
interpretative conflict which seems not to be resolvable by, and within, language.
That is why diplomatic ambiguity seems to invite immediately the power-related
considerations, and is mostly seen as a tool of a power-mechanism. The next section
will take the first step towards demonstrating how the concept and practice of
diplomatic ambiguity can be theorised from within the power-centric perspective.
2. THE POWER-CENTRIC PERSPECTIVE  THE FIRST STEP
Classical diplomatic theorists do not provide a fully developed power-centric view
of diplomatic ambiguity and such a view has never been elaborated in the form of
a theoretical study. This means that here I provide a reconstruction of such a view,
based on a number of comments provided, and assumptions endorsed, by some
7 That is why I believe that the research in diplomatic ambiguity should be primarily focused on
ambiguous agreements, in general, and on ambiguous peace agreements, in particular; for
my early reflections on the use of ambiguities in peace agreements, see Pehar (2001.).
8 See a similar explanation in Lord Caradon (1974.), and (1981.).
9 See Der Derian (1987.).
5_Pehar_korr.pmd 21.3.2006, 18:03157
Polemos 8 (2005.) 1-2: 153-182, ISSN 1331-5595
158
10 One, however, should be aware that at the Yalta conference, US President Roosevelt was
aware of the Yalta ambiguities. As former US Ambassador, and a close aid to Roosevelt,
Harriman claims, Roosevelt did not mind accepting ambiguities, or other parties providing
their own interpretation, as long as he was in position to provide an interpretation that he
thought would suit his, and the US, interests; for this see Harriman, Abel (1975.:399).
influential theorists of diplomacy. This section will be supplemented and completed
by the frame I propose in section 4.
My guess is that the theorists and theories referred to in this section are simply
reporting on a particular diplomatic practice. The fact that practice often gives
an impression of a tangible phenomenon known to everybody probably explains
why they did not put more effort into further developing their comments and
opinions about diplomatic ambiguity.
Here is how De Callieres, the 18th century author of the first influential treatise on
negotiations, pictures diplomatic ambiguity:  it is from this ignorance of one of
the contracting parties, and the dexterity of the other, that the difficulties arise
between Sovereigns, touching the explanation of the conditions of their treaties;
which occasions fresh disputes, and serves as a pretext for a rupture, to him who
has a mind to begin the war again, by giving a favourable interpretation for his
own advantage, to the terms and expressions which are obscure, ambiguous, or
equivocal in some of the articles of their treaties Callieres (1994.:156).
This paragraph requires some interpretation. What De Callieres had in mind is
the following. Two parties adopt an agreement. One party, X, believes that the
agreement will bring peace. But, the agreement is ambiguous. The other party, Y,
does not believe that the agreement will bring peace. It wants to use it as a pretext
for a rupture of relationships. That is why Y provides an interpretation of ambiguity
which is opposed to the interpretation by X. The relationship between those parties
turns again into a war-like relationship  fresh disputes. As ambiguity makes it
possible for the war-loving party, Y, to terminate a peaceful relationship, and as the
peace-loving party, X, was ignorant about this possibility, Y has been put at advantage
by diplomatic ambiguity. It can catch X by surprise, and use ambiguity as a weapon
to disrupt relationships and launch another war.
Fred Charles Iklé sees diplomatic ambiguity in a similar light. He claims that, one
party, while knowing what its opponent expected of the bargain, may pretend
that it had a different understanding of it (i.e. the ambiguities are exploited to
cover up a deliberate violation) (Iklé, 1967.:15). Iklé believes that this is exactly
what happened during the Soviet take-over of Poland, which was justified by
ambiguities of the Yalta Declaration. He emphasises that,  the ambiguity of the
Yalta Agreement inhibited the American government from opposing the Soviet
take-over of Poland more forcefully along the lines suggested by Churchill (Iklé,
1967.:11).10 In other words, the Soviet government, according to Iklé, manipulated
the US government into believing that the Soviet side will stick to the US
interpretation of the Yalta Declaration. Stalin, however, deceptively exploited
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his actions in Poland. The American governments hands were, as Iklé claims, tied by
diplomatic ambiguity.
Henry Kissinger described the Soviet Cold War strategy of ambiguity in similar
terms. In his Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy he claims that, the nature of the
Soviet challenge is, therefore, inherently ambiguous. It uses the legitimate language
of its opponents in a fashion which distorts its meaning and increases the hesitations
of the other side all dividing lines between war and peace, aggression and the
status quo, are gradually eroded and in a manner which never presents a clear-cut
issue to the West (Kissinger, 1969a:58).
Kissinger thus pictures ambiguity as something that generates confusion and
makes its victims uncertain. Ambiguity is used as shield behind which the Soviet
side can hide its true intentions. The Soviet side presents ambiguity which the Western
powers interpret too charitably; this makes those powers hesitant and puts Soviets
at advantage in the sense of enabling them to exploit the uncertainty and hesitation
of its principal Cold War rivals.
The three theorists picture diplomatic ambiguity as a dangerous weapon. One should,
as Callieres claims, try his best to make sure that ambiguities do not appear in
treaties/documents. Iklé adds to this that, as the Soviet practice indicated, ambiguity
allows one to violate a treaty by disabling the partner-side to oppose such a violation.
Kissinger also reports on ambiguitys ability to generate confusion and hesitancy in
its victims.
Thomas Franck, an influential theorist of international law, has comprehensively
presented similar considerations on all semantically indeterminate legal rules, which,
I believe, includes diplomatic ambiguity. He as well claims that ambiguities deprive a
rule of its pull towards compliance and thus seem to enable one to justify easily
their non-compliance with the rule (Franck, 1997.:31). In addition to this, he claims
that ambiguity must have a negative impact on perceptions of the rules fairness,
for the evident reason that it is thought fairer to impose rights and duties which
can be understood and anticipated by those to whom they are addressed than to
impose rights and duties which leave the reader unable to anticipate the vagaries
of its interpretation by bureaucrats, police, or judges (Franck, 1997.:33).
Diplomatic ambiguity is seen in the similar light also by many commentators and
analysts of specific peace agreements, instruments, and processes.
For instance, Herbert C. Kelman, an influential psychologist of conflict-behaviour,
comments on the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles signed by the PLO and Israel in
the following way:  the ambiguities that were purposely left in the DOP
[Declaration of Principles] in order to make an agreement possible also work in the
favour of the stronger party, which is better positioned to resolve them in its own
favour. It was this advantage, resulting from power-based, distributive bargaining,
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Edward Said, and many others, too, have characterised the ambiguous Oslo
agreements as a deception of the PLO by Israeli representatives and negotiators
(Said, 1995.:181). A Palestinian writer, Bishara claims that it was through diplomatic
ambiguity that, the Palestinians were manipulated into believing that they should
take whatever was offered and build on it until the final status negotiations arrived,
when they could ask for all their rights (Bishara, 2001.:51).
As to the UN Security Council Res. 242, some historians claim that the 242
ambiguity enabled Israel to deceive subtly the US,11 whereas some others claim that
it enabled the US to provide support to Israels continued occupation of the
Palestinian territory.12 According to former Egyptian foreign minister M. Riad
(1981.:65-75), in 1969 Nasser stated that he would continue to negotiate on the
basis of 242, but only for the sake of appearance and to please the US. Nasser
explicitly compared negotiations on 242 with a dark room promising no exit for
Egypt, and added that the only language Israel understands is the language of
arms.
What has motivated the aforementioned authors13 to place the concept of diplomatic
ambiguity in the proximity of power-considerations? Why did they choose to view
diplomatic ambiguity primarily as a device that opens the door to the exercise of
power?
Their reasoning can be reconstructed and put summarily in the following way.
The power-mechanism, which is based on diplomatic ambiguity, has an input and
an output. The input is composed of three factors: diplomatic ambiguity, an actor
who can be identified as the user (exploiter) of ambiguity, and an actor who can be
identified as the exploited (and victim) of ambiguity. The mechanisms output takes
the form of indefinite number of power-effects that all display a common feature 
language ceases to play a role in the relationship between those actors; it must be
taken as somehow silenced, which opens the door to power-relations as ones
primary and exclusive concern. Now, what is happening in the space between the
input and the output? Deception and confusion/uncertainty are the expressions
most frequently employed to describe that space. One party, A (the exploiter), is
aware of ambiguity. The other party, B (the victim), is not aware of ambiguity; it is
aware of only one of its meanings/interpretations. B signs to an agreement in the
belief that A as well signs to the agreement. However, A now relies on the fact of
the agreements ambiguousness. It presses on B its own, not Bs, interpretation of
the ambiguity. B can now respond in a number of different, but equally
unsatisfactory, ways. It can accuse A of deception; or it can keep insisting on its
own interpretation; or it can simply give up and accept that only an illusory agreement
was signed. But, due to the ambiguity, B cannot hope to provide the only satisfactory
11 Little (2003.:282) and Heikal (1996.:134).
12 For instance, El-Farra (1987.:121), Neff (1994.), and Chomsky (2003.:182).
13 One should not forget to add Morgenthau (1956.:405) to those I mentioned. One should,
however, bear in mind that there are many others who, explicitly or implicitly, endorse such
power-centric perspective.
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solution, which is to supply a quick and conclusive proof that As interpretation is
flawed, a proof in the form of a more consistent, and justified, interpretation. B
cannot conclusively prove that As (arbitrary) interpretation could and should be
replaced with Bs less arbitrary interpretation  both interpretations of an ambiguity
are equally arbitrary and equally justified. This, however, means that, due to the
ambiguity, the relationship between A and B seems to have been left without non-
-arbitrary foundations, and that the two have ceased to be bound by a rule that
could make their behaviour predictable to one another.
Let us notice here that A can easily unsettle Bs accusation of deception, because
it was B himself who initially focused on only one possible meaning of the ambiguity.
A has only taken advantage of Bs ignorance. This furthermore means that the
power-mechanism operating through diplomatic ambiguity requires a contribution
by the victim of such mechanism, its implicit, or passive, cooperation at the most
basic level. Such a mechanism requires that the victims mind is temporarily put
asleep, but one cannot blame the exploiter of ambiguity for putting his/her victims
mind asleep. Deception by ambiguity is comparable to mimicry. A mimic is not
directly responsible for the response of a deceived organism of which the mimic
may take some advantage. In actual fact, congenital flaws of the deceived organism
and congenital skills of the mimic join their forces to create a situation from which
the mimic alone will benefit.
Confusion/uncertainty can replace deception and deliver the same result. In
this section, however, I cannot fully explain how confusion can fill the space
between the input and the output of the power-mechanism that relies on diplomatic
ambiguity as its chief tool. One should only notice that whereas deception assumes
that the victims focus is on a single meaning of ambiguity, confusion assumes
that the victims focus is on both meanings of ambiguity, which can make him/her
uncertain, undecided, or confused, to which some further effects could follow
that a skilful exploiter of diplomatic ambiguity can exploit to his own advantage.
3. THE POWER-CENTRIC PRACTICE AND DIPLOMATIC
AMBIGUITY IN RAMBOUILLET DRAFT AGREEMENT14
I maintained that the aforementioned theorists and analysts should be taken as
reporting on an existing diplomatic practice in which the power factor plays the
dominant role. This explains why their comments on diplomatic ambiguity are so
brief and open-ended. The previous section has tried to make explicit some of the
assumptions underlying such a practice and organise them into a meaningful, though
yet to be completed, whole.
14 Though I believe that my account in this section is supported by sufficiently strong evidence,
it is possible that I have missed some essays, or memoirs, in the light of which the history of
the Rambouillet negotiations would look different. Moreover, I do not intend to generate the
impression that the US diplomacy is familiar only with the power-centric use of diplomatic
ambiguity. The aim of this section that I really care about is to indicate the practical relevance
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This sections ambition is to demonstrate that such power-centric practice of
diplomatic ambiguity has also characterised some of the important episodes of
contemporary diplomacy. The focus on such episodes could perhaps help us to
shed more light on the assumptions underlying the power-centric practice, and
move further towards full elaboration of the power-centric model of diplomatic
ambiguity.
In that regard, I believe that today we have enough evidence to claim reasonably
that in 1999 the US diplomacy has relied on diplomatic ambiguity as a tool of a
power-mechanism to achieve their objectives during the Rambouillet and Paris
negotiations dealing with the Kosovo crisis.
Negotiations between the Serb and the Kosovo-Albanian delegations started on
February 6, 1999 in Rambouillet, a castle and presidential retreat near Paris.15 The
main task facing the negotiators was to discuss and adopt constitutional
arrangements for Kosovo, an autonomous province of Federal Republic Yugoslavia
(FRY); three international diplomats were coordinating the mediating efforts:
American Cristopher Hill, Austrian Wolfgang Petritsch on behalf of the EU, and
Russian Mayorski. The main problem facing both the international mediators and
the very parties to the conflict was as follows. Despite the fact that a number of the
UN SC Resolutions, based on the UN Charter, guaranteed legal sovereignty of
Yugoslavia and inviolability of its borders, Kosovo Albanians, a majority in Kosovo,
were on their way to secede from Yugoslavia and declare independence. As to the
Serb population both in Kosovo and outside Kosovo, in Serbia proper, their
attachment to the province does not rest on numbers, as they are a minority in
Kosovo, but on a historical meaning Kosovo provides for entire Serbdom. Namely,
the Kosovo field was the place of the famous Kosovo battle by which the late 14th
century Ottoman armies broke into the region of the South-Eastern Europe. Serbs
call Kosovo the cradle of Serbdom.
Kosovo-Albanians thus wanted to secede from FRY. Serbs wanted Kosovo to
remain a part of FRY. Officially, the Rambouillet talks main purpose was to find a
way to reconcile those two seemingly irreconcilable wants.
Formally it was the EU together with the US and Russia who tabled the Rambouillet
draft agreement, a long and complex document, but the draft was in fact an American
one.16 One of the three international mediators to Rambouillet, Ambassador Petritsch
of certain ways of thinking of diplomatic ambiguity and substantiate the scenarios presented
in the second section in such a way that we can move further towards elaboration of an
applicable theory of diplomatic ambiguity.
15 My account is based on Petritsch, Kaser, Pichler (1999.:278-351), Kaser (1999.), Pilger (1999.),
BBC serial The Fall of Miloeviæ (mid-January 2003.), Weller (1999.), Judah (2000.), Daalder,
OHanlon (2000.), and a talk I had with Ambassador Petritsch in early 2000, in his Sarajevo
Office, where, following his mission to the FRY, he served as the High Representative of the
international community to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Amb. Petritsch carries no responsibility
whatever for the analysis I am presenting here.
16 Petritsch explained to me that he, but not the US representatives, favoured a short list of broad
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outlines the draft agreement in the following way: The agreement was marked by
a strong influence of international community. Kosovo was to de facto become a
temporary protectorate. As to the institutional part of the agreement, provisions
of the agreement were deliberately formulated in an ambiguous fashion to ensure
a wide space (Spielraum) for interpretation: it was foreseen that the international
influence in the civilian part be concentrated on an Implementation Mission, i.e.
the Chief of the Implementation Mission, who could remove or appoint public
officials as well as put a limit to those institutions that would act contrary to the
constitution. He was also provided with a wide responsibility in police matters
Formally, Kosovo would remain a constituent part of Serbia but the powers of the
Republic [to exert influence over Kosovo] would be limited to a significant degree
(Petritsch et al., 1999.:280-281; translation from the German original is mine).
Petritsch here claims that the agreement was formulated in an ambiguous fashion.
For instance, article I of the draft Constitution reads as follows: Kosovo shall have
authority to conduct foreign relations within its areas of responsibility equivalent
to the power provided to Republics under article 7 of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. The attribute equivalent can be interpreted in different
ways. Does it mean equal, or similar, or approximately equal? Let us also
notice that the official title of the document was Interim Agreement for Peace and
Self-Government in Kosovo. The Serb negotiators immediately cancelled out the
following three items from the title: Kosovo was replaced with, for the Serb side,
a politically more correct Serb variant Kosmet; as to interim as well as peace,
they simply wanted to delete the two (Petritsch et al., 1999:288). In other words,
the Serb side did not want to leave a possibility for one to reopen negotiations in
the future; they did not want to give Kosovo-Albanians another chance to press
demands for more autonomy within Yugoslavia. However, had they, the Serb
representatives, read more attentively, they would have noticed that article III of
the first Draft, or article I of chapter 8 of the final Draft, stipulates that amendments
to this Constitution would be adopted only by consent of all parties to the
agreement. Hence it was suggested that the draft agreement was interim, but also
permanent, provided one of the parties wanted to keep it that way.
The crucial issue of the Rambouillet talks, the issue of Kosovo-Albanian referendum
for independence, was addressed in the later part of the conference. I believe that
it was primarily the issue of referendum, and the way international mediators tackled
it, that turned Miloeviæs perhaps weak will to compromise into non-existent. The
international mediators, the US team primarily, tried to resolve this issue by means
of an ambiguity for which the then US State Secretary Madeleine Albright later
stated it was creative.17 The Italian representative to Rambouillet claimed that he
officially opposed the use of ambiguity to resolve the referendum issue, and that
principles from which more specific proposals would be drawn by deduction.
17 Albrights interview in The Fall of Miloeviæ (mid-January 2003, the first episode Defi-
ance).
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his logic was crystal clear  accepting the principle of sovereignty/inviolability of
borders unambiguously implied not giving Kosovo Albanians an ambiguous promise
of independence.18 How was the issue addressed?
Article III, provision 3 of the initial Rambouillet Draft Agreement reads as follows:
In three years, there shall be a comprehensive assessment of the Agreement under
international auspices with the aim of improving its implementation and determining
whether to implement proposals by either side for additional steps (Petritsch et al.,
1999.:294).
The Kosovo Albanian delegation demanded that to this provision be added a
clause opening the possibility of a referendum for independence of Kosovo, a demand
to which the international mediators responded ambiguously positively. The Serb
delegation did not want to hear a thing about the demand and it cancelled out the
proposed provision and emphasised again that there will be no changes to the
existing agreement without the consent by all. Here is how the Serb negotiators
formulated their proposal: After three years, the signatories shall comprehensively
review this agreement with a view to improving its implementation and shall consider
the proposals of any signatory for additional measures, whose adoption shall require
the consent of all signatories (Petritsch et al., 1999.:294).
At that moment the mediators have decided to launch a creative ambiguity. In
chapter 8, final clauses, article I, provision 3, the mediators have replaced the former
assessment-clause with the following: Three years after the entry into force of
this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a
mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people
[bold by Pehar], opinions of relevant authorities, each Partys efforts regarding the
implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a
comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider
proposals by any Party for additional measures (Petritsch et al., 1999.:XLIII).
But, now neither the Serb nor Kosovo-Albanian delegation was happy with the
creative ambiguity of the phrase on the basis of the will of the people. The Kosovo
Albanians voiced again their demand that referendum be explicitly mentioned,
but after the mediators rejected such a demand, the Kosovo-Albanian delegation
demanded that the international proposal be changed into on the basis of explicit
will of its people. However, the US and the EU negotiators rejected the second
demand as well (Petritsch et al., 1999.:305).
This has predictably diminished the Kosovo-Albanian delegations will to accept
the draft agreement. In those moments the US diplomats showed an increased
nervousness. As a close observer of the Rambouillet talks on February 28, 1999
reported, In its final chaotic hours, the Rambouillet peace conference on Kosovo
degenerated into a play lacking both a director and its main character (Hoagland,
1999). The last chaotic days and hours of the Rambouillet conference witnessed
two key junctures. First, the US provided to Kosovo-Albanian delegation a bilateral
assurance that the ambiguity of the assessment-clause means that the Kosovo
18 Interview in the same episode of The Fall of Miloeviæ.
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Albanians would hold a pro-independence referendum.19 The Russian representative
Mayorski learned about this and strongly protested. Secondly, as the EU
representation, due to internal disagreement over acceptability of the will of the
people-ambiguity, practically ceased functioning as a harmonious whole, this has
left only one major mediating player in the arena, the US.20
On February 23, 1999, a few hours before leaving Rambouillet, the Kosovo-
-Albanian delegation gave their conditional promise that they would accept the
Rambouillet Draft Agreement, in two weeks, after consulting the people of Kosova
and its political and military institutions. Their declaration also contained, in point
3, their interpretation of the referendum clause: the delegation of Kosova
understands that at the end of the interim period of three years, Kosova will hold
a referendum to ascertain the will of the people as provided in Article I (3) of
Chapter 8 of the Agreement (Petritsch et al., 1999.:309). The Serb delegation,
however, simply rejected the Rambouillet draft. As neither side gave their
straightforward consent to the draft, and as that implied that neither side could be
accused of rejecting a peaceful solution, the US was not in position to demand
immediate start of the NATO air strikes.
From March 15 till March 19 the talks resumed in Paris, but they brought no
substantial progress, except that the Kosovo-Albanian delegation this time signed
to the draft agreement without reservations. It is also interesting to notice that
within the period between Rambouillet and Paris, on March 8, the EU mediator
Petritsch held a meeting with the Serb President Milutinoviæ at which the two had
an extensive discussion about the system of judiciary under Rambouillet as well as
about the comprehensive post-interim period assessment clause. As Petritsch recalls,
he, by explaining that interpretability of certain important parts of the text was
deliberately chosen to give justice to both, mutually exclusive positions, opposed
Milutinoviæs objection that the draft agreement was too unclear in certain passages.21
For example, the Kosovo Serbs would thus be given an opportunity to call upon the
Serb institutions. As to the revision clause, Petritsch gave an advice to the Serb
President to specify the Serb position on the the will of the people passage in a
side letter (Petritsch et al., 1999.:327-8). But, Milutinoviæ did not respond to
Petritschs suggestion.
This means that the Serb negotiators were fully aware of ambiguousness of the
referendum clause. From the Serb point of view, the proposed agreement called
on the UN principles in the very preamble and recalled the commitment of the
international community to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
19 Weller (1999.:232) puts this ambiguously:  as a result of quite dramatic all-night negotia-
tions, one delegation may have indicated a willingness to give certain bilateral assurances to
the effect that this formulation did indeed refer to a right of the people of Kosovo to make
manifest their will in relation to the future status of the territory through a referendum.
20 See also Judah (2000, 213-16)
21 If this is the way Petritsch has really put it, this gives one a false impression that ambiguous
(interpretable) and self-contradictory mean almost the same.
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Republic of Yugoslavia (Petritsch et al., 1999:II). However, in relation to the Kosovo
Albanian referendum issue, the proposed wording was ambiguous. Let us, however,
imagine that, from the point of view of the Serb interest, the Serb negotiators
could have found at least some hope in the proposed ambiguity, that they could
have quieted their concerns by having said, well, it is still possible that our
interpretation of the referendum clause would prevail. This might have been
only a part of their problem. Another, perhaps bigger, problem for them was to
accept chapter 5 concerning implementation of the Rambouillet agreement. This
chapter sets the frame for an international implementation mission composed of
officials from abroad and headed by a (European, or American) Chief of the
Implementation Mission (CIM). Article V, the final article of the chapter 5, reads as
follows: The CIM shall be the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of
the civilian aspects of this Agreement, and the Parties agree to abide by his
determinations as binding on all Parties and persons (Petritsch et al., 1999.:XXVII).
More specifically, the Serb side may have their own interpretation of the revision,
i.e. referendum, clause, but it is the CIM who will determine the meaning of the
clause because he is the ultimate interpreter. Perhaps predictably, the Serb side has
never submitted its side letter with an interpretation of the on the basis of the will
of the people phrase. On March 19 the Paris negotiations too collapsed and the
Serb delegation rejected the last offer. On March 24 the NATO air strikes against
the targets in Yugoslavia began.
A close aid to the then US Secretary of State, M. Albright, said that there was only
one purpose (for the US diplomacy) in Rambouillet, to get the war started with
the Europeans locked in (OHanlon, 2000.:89, as quoted by Daalder).22 With that
purpose in mind, the use of diplomatic ambiguity by the US mediators can be
explained easily along the lines of the power-centric perspective.
The US purpose is to get the war started. But, this must be done in such a way
that none can accuse the US of a lack of will to search for a peaceful solution. The
Serb side must take all the blame for the failure of the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations.
The Serb side must do something that the US can use as a sufficient ground for
picturing the Serb side as being against peace, against a negotiated solution. In
other words, the Serb side must be somehow motivated (but not directly advised,
or provoked) to announce explicitly their decline of the Rambouillet Draft Agreement.
This is a sub-purpose of the US diplomacy in the arena of the Rambouillet negotiations.
Apart from that, the Europeans must be locked in. This means that they too
should be convinced about the correctness of the US negotiating tactics as well as
about the Serb unwillingness to accept a peaceful solution.
22 Daalder and OHanlon do not question this statement; in their view, even if the only purpose
of the Rambouillet/Paris talks was for the US to get an excuse to launch a military action
against FRY, the US diplomacy at Rambouillet and Paris was successful, when measured by
the ultimate outcome of the talks (!).
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23 Interestingly, at his last meeting with Hill, Petritsch, and Mayorski, on March 22, 1999, Miloeviæ
characterised the Rambouillet Draft as fraud/deception (Betrug in the German original of
Petritsch et al., 1999.:349).
The ambiguity of the referendum-clause can be fully illuminated now. The US
responds to the Kosovo-Albanian delegation request for a referendum at a crucial
stage of the Rambouillet negotiations. Let us notice that the preliminary Rambouillet
Draft makes no mention of referendum, or of a final settlement on the basis of
the will of the people. This can be interpreted as a huge concession to the
Kosovo Albanians and as a move towards supporting secession. But, this ambiguity,
being an ambiguity, does not have to be interpreted that way. The US negotiators
thus get a perfect alibi. If the Serb side interprets the referendum clause as a
hidden promise of pro-independence referendum for Kosovo-Albanians, such an
interpretation is but a Serb choice. The referendum ambiguity, however, threatened
to alienate the Kosovo-Albanian delegates as well. When they showed a desire to
opt out of negotiations, and decline the Rambouillet Draft, the US mediators thought
they would fail to achieve the main purpose of the Rambouillet conference. That is
why they provided bilateral assurances, probably only in an oral form, to the Kosovo-
-Albanian delegation to the effect that the referendum clause means that a pro-
-independence referendum would be held. Let us, however, notice that, under the
Rambouillet Draft, a pro-independence referendum by itself does not guarantee a
real independence. This is how the US diplomacy might have responded to the
Italian representative to Rambouillet who complained that the sovereignty of FRY
implies that one should not give an ambiguous promise of a pro-independence
referendum to the Kosovo-Albanian delegation. To give a promise ambiguously
means to give a promise that can be later reinterpreted and withdrawn, if needed.
In other words, no European could have accused straightforwardly the US
representatives of siding with the Kosovo-Albanian delegation, or of showing a
bias against the Serb side. Europeans were thus locked in.
One should notice here a striking similarity between De Callieres report on the use
of ambiguity to occasion fresh disputes and the use of the referendum ambiguity
to get the NATO strikes started. One of De Callieres parties, the war-loving one,
relies on ambiguity to oppose the other partys interpretation and thus turn their
seemingly peaceful relationship into a war-like one, after which a real war eventually
breaks out. In Rambouillet, we have a major party which relies on an ambiguity to
offer a peace, to which another party responds by supplying an interpretation to
the ambiguity which motivates it to decline such offer,23 of which the major party
then takes advantage and accuses the other party of the lack of will to accept a
negotiated and peaceful solution, which provides a rationale for a military strike
against the party.
I must re-emphasise here the point I already emphasised. Ambiguity cannot
perform the function of a tool of a power mechanism without an awkward, and
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advantaged, by such a power mechanism. That is why one cannot blame the US
diplomats for simply deciding to launch a war against a sovereign country. The US
ambiguity-based diplomacy of the Rambouillet and Paris talks paved the way to the
start of the NATO strikes, but, the Serb side, paradoxically, helped the US to create
a for many convincing impression that, all other means having been fully exhausted,
they could not have paved alternative ways.
In addition to this, I must also emphasise that the power mechanism, which
relies on ambiguity as its chief tool, also depends on the readiness of the exploited
to think of ambiguity in the power-centric terms. The Serb side must have believed
that, when it eventually comes to actual confrontation between their interpretation
of the Rambouillet ambiguities and the Kosovo-Albanian (or the US) interpretation
of those ambiguities, the undecidability of such a situation implies that language
would then cease to play the key function. One claim will be simply pressed against
the other, and whoever gets support by the more powerful would win. As, in the
Serb eyes, the Kosovo Implementation Mission, together with the Chief of the Mission
as the ultimate interpreter of the Rambouillet Agreement, was already marked as
an enemy, they must have believed that all the weight of the powerful would be
thrown behind the Kosovo-Albanian claims.24
4. THE POWER-CENTRIC PERSPECTIVE IN COMPLETE FRAME
After having presented a real case of diplomacy that relied on diplomatic ambiguity
to achieve a number of power-effects, we can now add the remaining assumptions
implicitly endorsed by the power-centric practice of ambiguity.
The power-driven strategy, which relies on diplomatic ambiguity, depends on the
concept of symbolic power. As P. Bourdieu characterised it, symbolic power is power
which produces a maximum effect with a minimum investment of energy;25 at the
same time, it is non-autonomous in the sense of being a legitimated form of other
forms of power (see Bourdieu, 1995., esp. 163-170). One can also characterise it as
the third dimension of power, in S. Lukess terminology. Symbolic power is the
power which heavily relies on a support of its victims; it does not consist in the
ability to force others to change their preferences according to the needs of the
24 This also explains why it is inaccurate to say that the Yugoslav government was simply
unwilling to accept the basic terms of the Rambouillet Agreement that are said to include
autonomy for Kosovo. The Yugoslav government was offered an ambiguous draft outlin-
ing an ambiguous (non)autonomy for Kosovo; the governments key problem was in the
drafts interpretability which implied a conflict of interpretations of which they thought that
its settlement would necessarily be to their (Yugoslav/Serb) disadvantage.
25 In that sense, the power-effect achieved by the means of ambiguity should be categorised
as a soft power-effect. In other words, ambiguity appears to open the door to the parties
exclusive focus on (hard)power-relations; but, please, note that such a function of opening
the door to an exclusive focus on (hard)power-relations is performed by a pattern of lan-
guage that is, by definition, a power of soft kind.
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powerful, but in the ability to take advantage of the (unchanged) preferences of
the others who unknowingly, and sometimes even knowingly, support a power-
-structure which puts not them at advantage, but others (Lukes, 2005.:77-8, and
86-7).
One should notice here that symbolic power must rely on a form of language
because language can produce a maximum effect with a minimum investment of
energy; at the same time, language is put into service of such a power; it performs
the role of an instrument of power. It does not perform normal functions of language,
which amount to communication, expression, and information-transmission. Such
language, as an instrument of power, carries cognitive, emotive/expressive, and
informative contents only to subordinate them to its main purpose, which is to
reduce all the relations between actors to power-relations.
Now we should be in a better position to understand why ambiguity is so frequently
thought of as related to, and inviting, power-considerations.
First, ambiguity is a two-horn phenomenon enabling two equally plausible
interpretations. Regularly, we tend to think of such duality of interpretation in
terms of the contrast between essence and appearance. So, one interpretation
must be essential, whilst the other merely apparent. Or, perhaps alternatively we
could think of both horns as being merely apparent and serving as a kind of
façade or cover for a third, essential feature. Let us call this the assumption of
essence-appearance contrast. In both cases, this implies that there is something
deceptive in ambiguity, including diplomatic one, because, if we accept the premise
that this contrast between essence and appearance serves a function, we would
tend to accept the opinion that the horn standing on the side of appearance
must be meant to mislead, or deceive, or deliberately cause an error, or something
that can be qualified as an error, in somebody.
Secondly, ambiguity is obviously a surplus of meaning, but for many, this surplus
could, in practical terms, generate an impression of the absence of meaning. When
we say something that means too much, i.e. that carries at least one meaning too
many, then our interlocutor may be at a loss to respond to our saying, or to attribute
something significant for him to our saying. In other words, prima facie ambiguity
seems to create emptiness by a language that has been self-silenced. Let us call this
the assumption of self-annihilated meaning. Typically, however, where language
ceases to play an important role, factors other than language will start to dominate.
This means that ambiguity tends to make one mute; it is as if s/he has seen an
apparition, a confusing figure, a sound that is like all sounds and no sound at the
same time. S/he will become susceptible to any explanation that can reduce her/his
cognitive unease.
Such considerations explain why we tend to consider the power-ambiguity
nexus as plausible. As ambiguity can be interpreted in at least two different ways,
this gives us two possibilities. Either only one meaning of ambiguity plays the key
role in the power-driven strategy of deception, or both meanings of ambiguity play
the role in the power-driven strategy of confusion-generation.
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26 This is Bourdieus quote of M. Beauzée; translation from the French original is mine.
Interestingly, P. Bourdieu, too, considers ambiguity as the chief tool of symbolic
power. His focus was mainly on the strategy of deception, in the light of which he
pictures ambiguity in the following way: LOUCHE/cross-eyed. In grammar this
word means indicating one sense but at the end determining quite different one.
This has been said especially about the phrases the construction of which contains
certain amphibological tour very harmless to clarity of the sentence  in the same
way the cross-eyed apparently look in one direction, but in reality looking in another
(Bourdieu, 1982.:79).26
Roland Barthes is another theorist picturing ambiguity as the tool of deception
in the service of ideological effects. He claims that the ambiguous nature of
ideological messages motivates their consumers to focus on falsely obvious, which
makes them willing to accept and unknowingly maintain the injustices inherent in
the capitalist world (Barthes, 1973.:109-159).
But, the deception-version of the power-centric theory of ambiguity is very
old. We find it in the First Book of The Histories by Herodotus. Herodotus narrates
about the Lydian king Croesus who received the famous prophecy from the Delphi:
once you cross the river Halys you will destroy a mighty empire. Believing that this
means that he would destroy the Persian Empire, Croesus launched a military attack,
which ends with his defeat by the Persians, and his own mighty empire destroyed.
The Delphis prophecy proved true, but not under the interpretation Croesus
supplied. Herodotus frequently used one attribute to characterise such ambiguous
prophecies, kibdelon, which means impure, or base (metal), but the root meaning
of which is adulterated, adulterous (wife) (Herodotus, 1993; see also Arieti,
1995). Such metaphor perfectly comprises the deception version of the power-
-centric theory of diplomatic ambiguity. Ambiguitys primary purpose is to enable
one to play a dual role in a triangular relationship, where one of the parties (the
exploited by the ambiguity) is necessarily deceived. Miloeviæs last description of
the Rambouillet Draft Agreement as a deception indicates that he saw himself as a
party disadvantaged by a triangular relationship (US/Kosovo-Albanians/Serbs) in which
the Rambouillet Draft ambiguity leads a double life.
Again, it must be stressed that the deception version operates on the
assumption that deception is not imposed; it is self-generated. Miloeviæ could
have adopted the Rambouillet Draft Agreement in the belief that he would manage
to pull trough his interpretation of the drafts key ambiguities. The Delphi did not
force Croesus to adopt the interpretation of the prophecy he adopted. De Callieres
qualifies the exploited as ignorant; Kissinger blames the western powers for not
being sufficiently rational in their dealings with ambiguous Soviet threats (see, for
instance, Kissinger, 1984.:11 and 337-8, and Kissinger, 1969b:14 and 29-34). Ikles
claims on deceptive ambiguity of the Yalta Declaration imply that the US miscalculated
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As to the confusion version of the power-centric theory of diplomatic ambiguity,
the pertinent metaphor is the metaphor of double-bind, as described by the Palo
Alto School of psychiatry (see Watzlawick et al., 1967.:211-219 and 86-7, and Bateson,
2000.:201-227). The Palo Alto theoreticians, including Bateson and Watzlawick,
formulated a theory in which one of the main causes of schizoid disorders is to be
found in the communication patterns within the families in which schizophrenic
patients are brought up. The Palo Alto School found out that ambiguities and
undecidable messages frequently occur in communication within those families.
Parents in those families convey to their children ambiguous messages behind which
a coherent intention cannot be discerned, which over time makes those children
permanently unable to communicate with others, and especially unable to form a
picture of communicative intentions of others. This of course has numerous power-
effects  a schizophrenic patient becomes totally dependent on others, other people
are being authorised to provide a definition of the outside world for, and on behalf
of, a schizophrenic patient etc.
Now we have a comprehensive picture of the power-mechanism employed by the
power-centric practice of diplomatic ambiguity. Such a power-mechanism rests on
a number of assumptions that, grouped together, form a power-centric model of
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5. LIMITATIONS OF THE POWER-CENTRIC PERSPECTIVE AND
A FRAGMENT OF A REASONED THEORY OF DIPLOMATIC
AMBIGUITY
A number of objections can be raised against the presented model of diplomatic
ambiguity.
First of all, the model obviously counts on sub-optimally rational actors in the
very basic sense of their not being able to recognise, and adequately respond to,
ambiguity as an ambiguity. The assumption of sub-optimal rationality is an empirical
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conjecture which will prove wrong many times. In other words, put a rational
language-using, i.e. human, being in place of the sub-optimally rational and you
will drastically reduce, and perhaps remove, the initial plausibility of the power-
-centric model.
Secondly, from an ethical point of view, the model invites us to view others as
seducible dummies. One could argue here that the exploiter of ambiguity does
not treat the exploited as seducible dummies as they are responsible for their
response to ambiguity. The exploiter only takes advantage of a situation created by
seducible dummies. But, even under this description, the situation is ethically
questionable because it is a part of the exploiters intention that seducible dummies
act as such. The exploiter does not attempt to optimise their sub-optimal rationality;
he channels its effects into the path of his interest.27
I do not claim that some other ethical considerations cannot override such ethical
argument against the power-centric model of ambiguity. Imagine that one deals
with a cruel tyrant who is also a seducible dummy. In such a situation one would
not object to the use of ambiguity along the power-centric lines. However, the use
of ambiguity in such a situation proves only that the desirability of ends (for instance,
weakening a cruel tyrant) overrides the non-desirability of means (exploiting the
tyrants sub-optimal rationality). This implies that the ultimate ends, or motivations,
of the US diplomacy in Rambouillet might have been just and ethically perfect: for
instance, to overthrow Miloeviæ and put an end to his regime, or to create a just
and peaceful Kosovo in which all its peoples could live in peace and harmony. In
view of such ends, the US use of ambiguity as a tool of a power-mechanism during
and after the Rambouillet/Paris talks, which is ethically questionable, might turn
out to have ultimately served positive ends, which is ethically unquestionable.
However, this only means that some ugly means were used to good ends; here I
cannot deal with the question of when, and under what conditions, good ends
justify, or excuse, such use of ugly means.
(Note also that I do not claim that ambiguity always serves the interests of the
stronger actor. I have presented a case in which, as I claim, it has indeed served the
interests of the stronger actor, but it would not be difficult to present, or imagine,
some other cases including perhaps the UN Security Council Resolution 242 [for
which see my footnote 11 as well as the sentence that footnote 19 referes to] in
which a weaker actor exploits a sub-optimal response to an ambiguity by a stronger
actor. In my view, this is not abnormal as power-relations are often contingent and
arbitrary.)
Thirdly, the power-centric model must take a deeply polarised view of the use of
ambiguities in diplomacy, on the one hand, and the use of ambiguities in other
realms of human cognitive activity, including arts, philosophy, science, and daily
communication, on the other. In those realms ambiguities primary purpose is to
inspire and rejuvenate both cognitive activity and communication by fore-
27 For the contrast between lie and verbal deception by equivocation, and for the argument that
the latter does not present a moral progress vis-a-vis the former, see Adler (1997.).`
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grounding language,28 by making it an explicit subject of scrutiny and discussion.
For instance, it is clear that double-binds do not only generate confusion, but
may prompt one to formulate a theory of such phenomena, as G. Bateson, inspired
by Russells theory of logical types, did. It is also clear that it was an extensive
exploitation of ambiguities by the Greek Sophists that motivated Aristotle to
formulate the first skeleton of the first theory of logic ever. Ambiguity is at the
heart of Kafkas fiction and of Henry Jamess.29 Both in poetry and daily
communication, one of the main functions of ambiguity is to draw the speakers
and the hearers attention to the medium of language itself,30 and motivate them
to reflect further on it and attempt to renew its communicative value.
Such facts cannot be reconciled with the power-centric model of ambiguity.
Such a model must assume that diplomacy and international politics give a special,
and highly specific, treatment to ambiguity that does not extend to other realms of
human cognitive activity. Against the power-centric model one could say that ones
approach to ambiguity should be holistic, and that the view one takes of ambiguity
in one broad realm of cognitive activity should be transferable to other broad
realms; the assumption that to each realm its own, and non-generalisable, theory
of ambiguity should be allocated, is highly counter-intuitive.
Fourthly, I explained that there are two assumptions that could motivate one to
endorse the power-centric view of diplomatic ambiguity, the assumption of essence-
appearance contrast and the assumption of self-annihilated meaning. However,
when we recall the concept of ambiguity as presented in the first section, we will
realise that, strictly speaking, neither of those assumptions is tenable. The meanings
of ambiguity are both potential and both equally supported by factual semantic
elements. This, however, implies that attribution of ambiguity does not draw a
distinction in ontological status of the individual meanings attributed. Being merely
potential, both meanings are equally apparent, and equally essential.
As to the second assumption, of self-annihilated meaning, it invites us to think
of ambiguity in terms of a contradiction which says both A and non-A, and which
thus cancels itself out. But, again, this assumption is flawed. Attributing ambiguity
does not mean attributing a self-contradictory meaning. The meanings of ambiguity
are not actually present in the ambiguity; one thinks of them as merely potential,
which implies that ambiguity is neither meaningless, nor contradictory; hence the
assumption of self-annihilated meaning is wrong.
We should conclude then that the power-centric view of diplomatic ambiguity is
flawed. This, however, does not mean that one should expect the power-centric
practice to disappear by itself. As long as there are sub-optimally rational actors of
diplomacy, and the actors willing, and being able, to exploit the sub-optimal rationality
28 Foregrounding here means emphasising the importance of language, moving it into the
foreground of observation, for which see Peng Su (1994.:168).
29 And, especially, at the heart of classical Greek tragedy, for which see Vernant (with Vidal-
Naquet) (1990.:113-140).
30 For the poetry, see Peng Su (1994, 168); for day-to-day communication, see Nerlich, Clarke
(2001.).
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of others, the power-centric practice of diplomatic ambiguity is likely to continue.
This also implies that, as a description of historical, contingent developments, the
power-centric view of diplomatic ambiguity can be very useful, because sometimes
actors are indeed sub-optimally rational and it is not difficult, or impossible, to
imagine the user of ambiguity who takes advantage of their sub-optimal rationality.
Still, we should not take this to mean that the power-centric theory is occasionally
true; we should take this to mean that some actors of international politics sometimes
display the behaviour-patterns the best account of which includes the assumption
that those actors hold a version of the power-centric theory of diplomatic ambiguity.
Such an assumption certainly implies a critique of such historical/international
developments as I am presenting it in this section, but we would need the power-
-centric view at least for the purpose of understanding the strategy the user of
ambiguity applies as I have presented it in the third section.31
How this all applies to the Rambouillet Draft ambiguities and the US diplomacy
during the Rambouillet/Paris talks?
Miloeviæ seems to have adopted the power-centric view of the Rambouillet
ambiguities. Seen in the light of my analysis, he has adopted a wrong view and
acted in a sub-optimally rational way. The US decision-makers have simply exploited
Miloeviæs endorsement of a wrong theory and, on the ground of Miloeviæs refusal
to accept a peaceful solution, launched a military strike against FRY. This of course
means that Miloeviæs choice was self-defeating because he chose an option that
brought him more losses than gains. But, one should not fail to notice that, under
the assumption that the US diplomacy has indeed used ambiguity as a means of the
power-centric practice, as strong evidence indicates,32 such use in the long run,
too, is self-defeating. First of all, the exploiter of ambiguity can unsettle a direct
attribution of responsibility to him/her, as the US can claim that Miloeviæs was
responsible for his reading of the Rambouillet Draft on the basis of which he decided
to decline it. But, due to the very same ambiguity, the US can never fully prove their
innocence. The US did nothing to convince Miloeviæ that his reading of the
Rambouillet Draft was at least a plausible possibility. Let us recall that Delphi, in the
31 A plausible analogy is perhaps as follows. There is no such thing as producing white rabbits
out of a magic hat. If you believe that a white rabbit has been produced out of a magic hat,
you are wrong and suffer from an illusion. It is also important to note that, under certain
conditions, everyone is prone to form the belief that a white rabbit has been produced out of
a magic hat. So, the theory in which white rabbits may be produced out of a magic hat is
wrong. But, every description of the illusion that observers experience will necessarily refer to
the production of white rabbits out of a magic hat.
32 Additional evidence includes: an obvious lack of will, on the US part, to convince, and/or
motivate Miloeviæ to accept the Rambouillet Draft; US bilateral assurances to the Kosovo-
Albanian delegation; immediately after the Racak massacre on January 15, 1999, the US has
repeatedly expressed their readiness to bomb Serbs straightaway (the Rambouillet confer-
ence was a result of Jacques Chiracs initiative); a pronounced will, on the part of the US, not
to extend deadlines despite the fact that the Rambouillet Draft was a huge and complex
document.
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Croesus story by Herodotus, have tried to place all blame on Croesus himself for his
interpretation of the prophecy, but, they never managed to prove their full
innocence. Delphi said that they prophesised that a mighty empire was going to be
destroyed, and that a mighty empire was destroyed, which proved their prophecy.
But, the fact is that the mighty Lydian empire was destroyed, and it was impossible
for Delphi to prove that that is exactly what they meant. Similar considerations
apply to the US diplomacy of the Rambouillet ambiguities. Too many facts speak for
the reasonable belief that the US expected from Miloeviæ to read the Rambouillet
Draft in a particular way and decline a peaceful solution, leaving thus the US with
the only remaining option  to start the engine of the NATO war-machine.
Secondly, and this is why one should characterise the US power-centric handling
of the Rambouillet ambiguities as potentially detrimental to the US diplomacy in the
long run, the power-centric view of diplomatic ambiguity implies a commitment to
the idea that language (of ambiguity) is subordinated to power-considerations;
that, for instance, the purpose of an ambiguous peace agreement is fully exhausted
by its ability to replace language-related considerations with power-related ones.
Under such assumption, an ambiguous peace agreement, offered or mediated by
the US diplomacy, would look very suspect, and its potential parties would probably
hesitate to sign to it. Hence, in the situation where the US interest in brokering a
peace agreement is strong and honest, the power-centric perspective on diplomatic
ambiguity is likely to act as an impediment to the very US interest.
My reliance on a piece of historical evidence, which seems to speak in favour of
the view against which I have subsequently proposed several arguments, may appear
to some readers as odd.33 I start by describing certain diplomatic developments
after which I present a view that seems to explain such developments in sufficiently
clear and plausible terms. Why do we then need an alternative view? I believe we
need it for at least two reasons: 1. Apart from the fact that we need some view
that would be immune from the arguments that undermine the contending (i.e.
power-centric) view, we need such an alternative view to explain and describe some
uses of diplomatic ambiguity that cannot be adequately explained by the power-
-centric view; 2. Even if there were no alternative uses of diplomatic ambiguity, or
no available historical evidence of such alternative uses, we would need such an
alternative view to help us to improve our (diplomatic) practice. In other words, in
the world of social and political affairs theory and practice are inseparably
intertwined; therefore a theory cannot be fully exhausted by its descriptive, or
explanatory, dimensions. Its plausibility and standing need to be measured also by
its ability to project alternative worlds, to substantiate and support an enlightened
criticism, to free us from biases, irrationalities and bad habits, and, last but not
least, to supply foundations for a more humane and progressive practice.
33 It appeared so to my referees; insufficient clarity of my first draft has certainly contributed to
such an appearance which I will here try to dispel.
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Are there, in either of the aforementioned senses, any alternatives to the power-
-centric view of diplomatic ambiguity? Could we lay foundations for a more reasoned
theory/practice of diplomatic ambiguity?
Here I can only give a few hints about alternatives to the power-centric view,
and lay sketchy, but in my view viable, foundations for a reasoned theory of diplomatic
ambiguity.
One alternative to the power-centric approach is to think of diplomatic ambiguity
simply as an invitation to apply the rules of legal interpretation. In other words, the
attribution of ambiguity implies that one needs to disambiguate it, which can be
done by applying a set of rules of interpretation to the ambiguous text/document.
If we can formulate a number of such rules, we could perhaps give them the status
of compulsory rules having the force of law. This is exactly how the International
Law Commission reasoned whilst drafting the interpretation Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.34 As those articles represent the only
internationally valid frame for treaty interpretation, this means that a success of the
legal approach to the issue of diplomatic ambiguity should be primarily judged by
the answer to the question of the extent to which Articles 31 and 32 provide a
viable tool of legal interpretation.
Here I cannot provide a detailed argument, but it will suffice to say that, in my
opinion, and for the reasons that I do not have enough space to elaborate here,
the 31 and 32 are as well open to interpretation; they too can be reasonably described
as ambiguous.35 This, however, does not mean that they are utterly useless, as
different parties could, in the course of international legal proceedings, agree on
an acceptable interpretation/meaning to be attributed to those articles; however,
for obvious reasons, such an agreement would have to transcend the boundaries
of the legal approach to the process of disambiguation; namely, the parties to such
an agreement would not be in position simply to re-apply Articles 31 and 32 to the
very process of interpretation of those articles.
This, then, should motivate one to search for another alternative to the power-
-centric perspective.
For a start, let us note that differences in meaning-attribution often depend on,
and go hand-in-hand with, differences in belief-attribution. As Donald Davidson
emphasised, I have butterflies in my stomach is usually taken to mean that the
speaker is nervous and that he intends to express his perception/belief that his
nervousness makes him feel tremors in his stomach. I have butterflies in my stomach
hence usually implies a metaphoric meaning and an ordinary belief. But, the speaker
could also express this sentence as a literal truth implying that he really, perhaps
due to a psychotic disorder, believes that he has butterflies in his stomach.36 In this
case, the speakers sentence would imply a literal meaning and an idiosyncratic
belief.
34 For this see, in particular, Sinclair (1984.:114-158) and Yearbook of the International Law
Commission (1965.:199-206).
35 This is also implicitly acknowledged by Sinclair (1984.:153).
36 Davidson is using a slightly different example to make the same point in Davidson (1982.:257).
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Let us now imagine that, at the moment, all available evidence does not suffice
for one to make a sound and defensible judgment as to what the speaker really
means. In other words, let us imagine that we have to qualify his utterance as
ambiguous. This means that the attribution of ambiguity, like the attribution of
actual meaning, often depends, in implicit and usually unrecognised ways, on the
attribution of beliefs.37 I cannot form a conclusive belief on the belief held by the
person saying he has butterflies in his stomach; I can form only potential beliefs.
This is further manifested in the fact that I cannot attribute a conclusive meaning to
his sentence; I can attribute only potential meanings to the sentence. Seen in such
a light, ambiguity rests on a conflict between two incompatible funds of beliefs;
ambiguity persists as long as one cannot decide between such funds.
If the attribution of ambiguity implies an incompatibility in beliefs,38 ambiguity
can be disambiguated only by finding a shared fund of beliefs. This does not mean
that one of the incompatible sets of beliefs cannot win over the other, but one has
to demonstrate plausibly that his set of beliefs is more consistent, more relevant,
and more convincing than the other. As the attribution of ambiguity also depends
on a prior assumption that the two incompatible sets of beliefs are of equal strength
and plausibility, those two sets will have to be upgraded, enriched, and improved
to be able to participate in the competition for the winning interpretation. This,
however, simply means that ambiguity is nothing but a start of a dialogue; it marks
the start of a process by which an untenable situation of undecidability/incom-
patibility would be replaced with a viable construction of a shared fund of beliefs
superior to the initial funds.
Ambiguous provisions of the peace agreements, those par excellence instances
of diplomatic ambiguity, usually cover highly contested fields. We use them to mark
an area where competing and conflicting ethico-political principles cannot deliver
an unambiguous solution. Usually, when we identify an ambiguity in a crucial passage
of a peace agreement, what we identify is simply ones inability to decide between
the demands pressed by different and seemingly irreconcilable principles that guide
our social and political lives: the principle of self-determination, the principles of
justice, the principle of stability, the principle of equality, the principles of utility and
convenience etc. etc. It is for such a reason that the dialogue prompted by a
diplomatic ambiguity must be concerned with very complicated and perplexing
theoretical matters.39 One should thus expect the dialogue on ambiguities to turn
37 Davidson has many times emphasised the dependence of the factor of meaning on the factor
of belief; see, for instance, Davidson (1984.:141-154), and Davidson (1999a).
38 Such incompatibility of beliefs, made manifest through incompatibility of interpretations, is
what frequently explains disagreements within the US Supreme Court during their delibera-
tions on proper interpretation of some of the clauses of the US Constitution; for one particu-
larly clear example, see Dissenting Opinion of Justice T. Marshall in Gregg v. Georgia, in
Grèiæ (1989.:341-3); for a clash of beliefs that underlie different (and incompatible) interpre-
tations of the ambiguities of the Dayton Constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Kuniæ,
Trnka (1998.).
39 There is only one requirement I place on such a dialogue  it should run under the assumption
of the principle of charity, which demands that we communicate in ways that sustain com-
5_Pehar_korr.pmd 21.3.2006, 18:03177
Polemos 8 (2005.) 1-2: 153-182, ISSN 1331-5595
178
into a dialogue between competing ethico-political meta-theories, which might
sound surprising from the perspective of ordinary diplomatic and international-
-political life. The point of my claim is, in this regard, sufficiently clear  one should
not expect a quick and easy solution of the conflict of interpretations to which
diplomatic ambiguity gives rise.
What, then, makes my view of diplomatic ambiguity distinctive?
In contrast to the power-centric perspective, my view of diplomatic ambiguity is
moderately positive. It does not invite deception, or confusion, but clarity in
exposition, and confrontation, of beliefs as an adequate response to ambiguity. In
contrast to the legal approach, my view emphasises the role of beliefs. An emphasis
on the process of interpretation as a discovery/construction of meanings, which is
characteristic of a legal approach, rests on a too narrow understanding of language.
My view of diplomatic ambiguity is also a dialogical view: it explains why the passage
from ambiguity to disambiguation must take the form of a dialogue in which entire
clusters of beliefs, and theories, must be confronted, scrutinised, tested, reorganised,
and revised.40 Therefore the dialogical view gives one a clear sense in which
ambiguity invites its interpreters to remain confined to the realm of language, to
remain language-centric. Finally, it is only in the light of the dialogical view, not of
the other two, that diplomatic ambiguity can be seen as consistent with Der Derians
image of diplomacy as mediation of estrangement.41 Had the dialogical, and
language-centric, view of diplomatic ambiguity been adopted during the 1999
Rambouillet/Paris peace talks, their outcome would have surely been very, very
different.
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DIPLOMATSKE VIESMISLICE: OD PRAKSE




Autor predlae teorijski vodiè za analizu diplomatske viesmislice orijentiranu prema praksi.
Polazeæi od komentara koje su dali klasièni teoretièari diplomacije te vlastitog povijesnog
tumaèenja uporabe diplomatske viesmislice tijekom pregovora u Rambouilletu o statusu
Kosova, autor nudi rekonstrukciju pristupa diplomatskoj viesmislici u èijem je sreditu pojam
moæi. To je pristup koji su implicite prihvatili kljuèni akteri pregovaraèkog procesa u
Rambouilletu. Premda nam taj pristup moe dati stanoviti uvid u kontingentne, povijesne
dogaðaje te nam pomoæi da razumijemo neke sluèajeve diplomatske prakse, on ipak pati od
vie nedostataka koji ga èine nepouzdanim kandidatom za odrivu i cjelovitu teoriju
diplomatske viesmislice. Autor prezentira, u rudimentarnom i preliminarnom obliku, jedan
alternativni, vie racionalni, pristup diplomatskoj viesmislici koji je ne-legalistièki te primarno
orijentiran ka jeziku, a istovremeno, dostatno prijemèiv za doksatièke/kognitivne aspekte
viesmislice i takoðer sukladan Der Derianovom pojmu diplomacije kao posredovanja
otuðenosti.
Kljuène rijeèi: diplomatska viesmislica; pristup viesmislici u èijem je sreditu pojam moæi;
racionalni pristup viesmislici; pregovori u Rambouilletu; mirovni pregovori; diplomacija
SAD-a
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